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The Programming of EU’s External Assistance
and Development Aid and the Fragile Balance
of Power between EEAS and DG DEVCO
Isabelle TANNOUS*
The LisbonTreaty left the question of the future organization of the European Union’s external
assistance and development aid largely unanswered. It was only after its entry into force on 1
December 2009 and with the adaptation of the European External Action Service (EEAS)
that a major organizational revision of the EU’s foreign aid was set in motion. Development –
and in its extension neighbourhood – is now the crucial area of work that straddles both the
EEAS and the Commission.This article outlines the dispute over the division of labour of the
programming and management cycle and the tools of European external assistance and
development aid. The subsequent reorganization of powers between the EEAS, the new DG
DEVCO and the up-graded EU Delegations is examined and the general impact of this
rearrangement on the future paths of the EU’s foreign policy is tackled. The focus lies on
strategic planning and programming of EU’s main external action instruments for the years
2014–2020: the European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation
Instrument (DCI) and the new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI).
1 INTRODUCTION
Expectations are high for the Post-Lisbon era. With the establishment of the
European External Action Service (EEAS) Europe’s stance in the world is
supposed to become more coherent, effective and visible, finally leaving behind the
long-standing divide of foreign and security policy and the European
Commissions’ portfolios ‘development’ and ‘neighbourhood’.1 Anyone who has
followed the evolution of European foreign policy in recent decades knows of the
drop height of these political ambitions, in particular in view of the little concrete
guidelines envisaged in the Treaty. After all, the Lisbon Treaty left the future
organization of the European Union’s (EU’s) external assistance and development
aid largely unanswered. It was only after its entry into force on 1 December 2009
* Information Research Division ‘European Affairs’ and ‘EU External Relations’, German Institute for
International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin. This article is based on an earlier, German version
published in the quarterly journal ‘integration’ of the Institute for European Politics (IEP), Berlin.
1 See H. Merket, The European External Action Service and the Nexus between CFSP/CSDP and
Development Cooperation, 17 European For.Affairs Rev. 4, 625–651 (2012).
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and with the adaptation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) that the
organizational setting and the five-staged programming and management cycle was
supposed to be re-organized between the EEAS and the Commission. Today,
development – and in its extension neighbourhood – is the crucial area of work of
the EU that straddles both the EEAS and the Commission.This article sets out to
scrutinize the impact and hurdles of the status quo of external assistance and
development aid that is due to the deadlock for reform in European foreign policy
most likely to stay on after the EEAS review process in mid-2013.
To this end, the article first sets out to provide an overview of the revised legal
provisions and objectives introduced with the Lisbon Treaty against the
background of the changing global development agenda (section 2). Their
translation into practice with the setting-up of the EEAS and the dispute over the
division of labour between the EEAS and Commission’s Directorate General
‘Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid’ (DG DEVCO) is then displayed
(section 3). Against this background, the administrative structures and
institutionalized roles of the actors involved are introduced (section 4).The revised
complex organizational arrangements between the Service and DEVCO for the
programming of external assistance and development aid for the Multiannual
Framework 2014–2020 that call for the full interlocking of the EEAS into the
Commission system can thus be presented (section 5). Finally, the general impact
of this revision on the future paths of the EU’s external relations in times of the
euro crisis is tackled (section 6).
2 A STRONG LEGAL BASIS FOR DEVELOPMENT INTHE PRIMARY
LAW PROVISIONS OFTHE LISBONTREATY
The ties of the EU to the developing world are as old as the integration process
itself, and the EU of today has relations with partner countries in all regions
around the world. Nonetheless, development policy does not only get little
attention, especially in comparison with the vast research on Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), it
is still often only associated with the relations of the EU to 79 African, Caribbean
and Pacific states (ACP). This is particularly astonishing for a substantial share of
the external action instruments under the Heading 4 ‘Global Europe’ of the
general EU budget can be classified as Official Development Aid (ODA). The
EU’s external assistance and development aid under this heading provides
particularly resources for enlargement (Pre-accession Instrument (IPA) – 90%
ODA), neighbourhood (European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENPI) – 95% ODA)
and development (Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) DCI – nearly 100%
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ODA and, outside the EU budget, EDF – European Development Fund, nearly
100% ODA).2
The EU earned, despite all the criticism, its reputation as world biggest donor
not only by the mere amount of its commitments, but also with the
comprehensive reform process of its development policy after the uncovering cases
of fraud and corruption in the Santer-Commission at the end of the 1990s.
Structures and decision-making procedures of EU’s development cooperation
were thoroughly modernized – the ongoing conceptual adaption found its
reflection in the European Consensus on Development3 (2005) and, more recently, in
the Agenda for Change4 (2011). Today, the EU is widely acknowledged as an
international agenda-setter and well embedded into the global development
agenda.5 The modest success of development ambitions is once again challenged
in general by the change of the wider global development agenda. During the past
decade the rising influence of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
(BRICS states) on the scene as well as the ‘Arab Spring’ have changed character
and coordinates of European development policy.
While the consequences deriving from these dynamics remained to a large
extent hidden behind the technocratic-style of day-to-day management for quite
some time now, the institutional changes with the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European
Commission (HR/VP) and with the establishment of the EEAS in particular are
now clearly visible.The accompanying change is recognized as an opportunity but
also as a challenge for the EU’s development cooperation as a genuine and
distinctive policy.6 On the one hand, issues such as improved coherence, higher
transparency and effectiveness of the measures taken as well as new options for a
more proactive development cooperation have attracted a great deal of attention.
On the other hand, however, observers are alarmed about a potential
subordination of long-term development aims – poverty reduction in the first
place – to a short-term, security-oriented foreign policy.
These basic questions already waited for answers during the Convent on the
Future of the EU and during the elaboration of the Lisbon Treaty. Their
2 Other instruments, albeit much smaller, such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human
Rights (EIDHR – 100 % ODA), the Instrument for Stability (IfS – 30 % ODA) and Humanitarian
Aid (100 % ODA) are also ODA funded.
3 Joint declaration by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within
the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission:The European Consensus, O.J.E.U. C 46 (24 Feb.
2006).
4 European Commission, Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change,
COM(2011) 637 final (Brussels, 13 Oct. 2011).
5 See M.Holland & M.Doidge,Development Policy of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2012).
6 See for example European Think-Tanks Group (ODI / DIE / FRIDE / ECDPM), New Challenges,
New Beginnings. Next Steps in European Development Cooperation (Feb. 2010).
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explosiveness became obvious in a literally eruptive way when the guidelines
entailed in the Treaty were substantiated with regard to the organization of the
EEAS, as we will see later on. At first glance, whatsoever, the revised legal
framework set up with the Lisbon Treaty did not change much for external
assistance and development aid:The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was
provided with an own article (Article 8 TEU), the EU development cooperation
continues to be an independent policy on its own and at the same time becomes
an integral part of EU’s external action (Articles 208–211 TFEU).7 The Lisbon
Treaty maintains poverty reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of
poverty, as development cooperation’s primary objective. In addition, eradicating
poverty is now even a postulated goal among others in the general provisions
preceding the entire title V ‘External Action’ (Article 21 TEU). Moreover, the
Union has to support the objectives of development cooperation when
implementing policies that can affect the developing countries (Article 208
TFEU), as already set with the agenda for Policy Coherence for Development
(PCD).8 The Treaty states that the EU’s development cooperation policy and that
of the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other. The shared
competence between the EU institutions and Member States continues with the
upgrading that ‘in the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the
Union shall have competence to carry out activities and conduct a common
policy’ (Article 4 TFEU). Consequently, the Lisbon reform transfers thus primarily
the recent developments between theTreaty reforms into EU primary law.
The legally fixed coordinates therefore remain unchanged overall –
nonetheless, the past Treaty reform is far more than a mere renumbering of
previous Treaty provisions: First and above all, the Lisbon Treaty demands a higher
degree of consistency of its EU’s external action and foresees to this respect new
institutions and procedures. Due to the extensive changes competences are
likewise pooled and redistributed in the field of external assistance and
development aid. The distribution of competences between the EEAS and the
Commission and a comprehensive approach of whatever kind have stirred up
fundamental questions about the future of EU development cooperation – to an
extent that might give leeway to fundamental change of EU development
cooperation as a whole.
7 See M. Broberg, What Is the Direction for the EU’s Development Cooperation After Lisbon? A Legal
Examination, 16 European For.Affairs Rev. 4, 539–557 (2011).
8 Commission Staff Working Paper, EU 2011 Report on Policy Coherence for Development, SEC(2011)
1627 final (15 Dec. 2011).
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3 THE EEAS ANDTHE DISPUTE OVER EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE
AND DEVELOPMENT AID
Before the EEAS could even start work, it was necessary first of all to clarify the
institutional and personnel coordinates. After all, the Heads of State and
Government both at the Convention and in Lisbon had failed to find a common
ground in a number of politically controversial and complex organizational
questions.9 The Treaty provided only a rough framework, in particular with regard
to Article 27 TEU dealing with the EEAS and Article 221 TFEU dealing with the
EU Delegations. In what form the EEAS should work for the High
Representative was not specified in detail as little as the manner of its composition
and the modes of cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States
and the European Commission. Bundling the unresolved issues, in essence a
central question remains: How will the strategic planning and programming of the
external assistance and development aid between the Service and the Commission
be designed from now on?
In view of the amount of funds allocated for external assistance and
development aid this is an important question. The general budget 2012 – not
including the European Development Fund (EDF), which is separately funded by
the Member States – earmarked in section 4 ‘Global Europe’ 27.6% for the
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) alone. If we also add the resources
for the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which
account for 24.4%, these two important instruments taken together comprise over
50% of the funds provided.10 If the EDF is included, which is positioned outside
the EU budget, the three largest external assistance and development aid
instruments EDF, DCI and ENPI together amount for 9% of the total EU budget.
The EEAS – given that the Service is working closely with the Member
States and the European Commission – brought about the opportunity not only
to harmonize European Commission’s and EU Member States’ programming
cycles for the purpose of joint programming and to establish more coherent links
among diverging policies. Above all, the diplomatic Service was seized as an
opportunity to add development to the ‘tool box’ of European foreign policy
under a more comprehensive approach. However, EU Member States even after
Lisbon are only to a certain extent willing to allow the Commission to coordinate
their development initiatives – not to speak of controlling them. It is not in their
interest to comply with their commitment to provide aid under pressure from
9 See S. Duke, The European External Action Service: Antidote against Incoherence? 17 European For. Affairs
Rev. 1, 45–68 (2012).
10 For the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 20.2 % were earmarked, 8.5 % for
Humanitarian Aid and only 4.2 % for CFSP. Figures are based on European Commission, EU Budget
2012 (Luxembourg 2012) (own calculations).
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Brussels, or, as agreed in the voluntary EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and
Division (2007), to coordinate their priorities with each other.The establishment of
the EEAS, then, allowed those EU countries that were still interested to make
sovereign decisions in the area of external assistance and development aid, to
relocate strategic competencies to the EEAS, and thus (again) in an institution
placed nearer to the Member States.
This involved – in addition to the long-standing issue of ‘budgeting’ the EDF
– the two most important foreign-aid instruments DCI and ENPI, which are
managed by the Commission. Those Member States which want to take a stand
via their development cooperation or want to dovetail development engagement
with foreign policy, see themselves in a competition with the Commission as an
actor with wide-ranging competences regarding development and neighbourhood
policies.
In light of the above it was hardly surprising, therefore, that the dispute over
the EEAS’ form – and thereby the future direction of the EU’s external relations
– was inflamed by the issue of external assistance and development aid right at the
presentation of Catherine Ashton’s first policy paper of 25 March 2010.11
Catherine Ashton had made clear very early during the EEAS negotiations that
she regards foreign and development aid as an integral part of the toolbox of the
EU, or, more precisely, as located ‘in the heart of the European Union’s external
action’.12 At the start of the negotiations in March 2010, she delineated the EEAS
as a unique opportunity to ensure the consistency of the external action of the
Union and to gather the tools available – from the economic and political
instruments up to the civil and military crisis-management capacities – under a
often claimed but never defined single political strategy.
With regard to the distribution of powers between the Service and the
Commission Ashton suggested different scenarios for the programming of the key
external action instruments: These ranged first, from the transfer of the entire
programming to the EEAS, and second, a shared-work approach under the
auspices of the Commission, to third, a regional division of labour in which the
Commission would be responsible for Africa and the Service would take care of
Asia and Latin America. Ashton did not intend to hand over the allocation of
development aid to the Commission only, accordingly, she called for the EEAS’s
financial planning authority for almost all major development funds.13 Her design
11 Proposal from The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Draft Council Decision
Establishing the Organization and Functioning of the European External Action Service (25 Mar. 2010).
12 Catherine Ashton, High Representative/Vice President, Speech to the European Parliament’s foreign affairs
committee European Parliament, SPEECH/10/120 (23 Mar. 2010).
13 See S. Blockmans & S. Duke, The Lisbon Treaty Stipulations on Development Cooperation and the Council
Decision of 25 March 2010 (Draft) establishing the organization and the functioning of the European External
Action Service (EIPA,Working Paper 2010/W/01, 2010).
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tended to be closer to an EU foreign ministers’ approach circulated by the Spanish
EU Presidency, but also picked up other scenarios discussed before.While Member
States had claimed the leadership of the EEAS during the first stages of the
programming cycle (and thus the strategic and political responsibility) and then
would have allotted the subsequent stages to the Commission (such as
implementation and evaluation), the Commission had favoured a vertical split
along geographical lines rather than such a horizontal division of powers.
As expected, Ashton’s draft called up resistance by some of the EU states as
well as by the Commission.While Member States criticized that the Commission
would continue to take part in strategic planning, the Commission took Ashton’s
presentation as a direct attack on competences it had acquired during several
decades. It felt that its rights had been curtailed and feared to be demoted to a
mere executive agency of the EEAS. Cautious not to lose any competences to the
EEAS, the Commission had at an early state vehemently advocated for a retention
of its responsibilities in the areas of ‘development’ and ‘ neighbourhood’ – and thus
for the most important instruments for external assistance.
After the Heads of State and Government had agreed on Ashton’s proposal
on 26 April 2010 with only a few changes, the Commission received intensive
backup from the European Parliament.The Parliament, unlike the Member States
and the Commission, had not been involved in the preparatory work for Ashton’s
draft. Nonetheless, the Parliament had before the disclosure of the draft already
favoured a tight linking of the EEAS with the Commission with the ‘non-paper’
by Elmar Brok and Guy Verhofstadt.14 These Proposals for the establishment of the
EEAS claimed that programming and management is to be realized under the
Commissioner responsible in order to ensure coherence and avoid divergences
between political goals and implementation of the financial assistance on the
ground.The European Parliament, by negotiating the establishment of the EEAS
in a single package, took the opportunity to expand its own sphere of influence
and to support the Commission in the new construction accompanying the EEAS
through the lever of the budgetary control.15 The compromise, reached by the
so-called quadrilogue in Madrid on 21 June 2010, was adopted on 8 July 2010
with a large majority.16 After months of protracted negotiations a political
agreement could finally be reached that allowed the adoption of the EEAS
14 Working document by Elmar Brok (AFET), and Guy Verhofstadt (AFCO), rapporteurs on EEAS,
Proposal for the establishment of the EEAS (6 Apr. 2010 and 20 Apr. 2010) (updated version).
15 Report on the proposal for a Council decision establishing the organization and functioning of the European
External Action Service, Rapporteur, Elmar Brok, 08029/2010 – C7-0090/2010 – 2010/0816(NLE) (6
Jul. 2010).
16 See for example EPC / EGMONT / CEPS, The Treaty of Lisbon: A Second Look at the Institutional
Innovations, Joint Study, at 148 (September 2010); L. Erkelens & S. Blockmans, Setting up the European
External Action Service.An institutional act of balance (CLEERWorking Papers 1, 17, 2012).
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Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organization and functioning of
the European External Action Service (further:‘EEAS Decision’).
4 THE BALANCE OF POWER OF EEAS AND DG DEVCO: FROM
INSTITUTIONAL DISSONANCESTO INTER-SERVICE HARMONY?
With the ‘EEAS Decision’ a clarification of fundamental issues had been finally
achieved.17 As so often, however, in the end this decision came about only by
resorting to vague formulations conceding enough room for interpretation to all
participants. Especially with regard to the organization of the EU’s external
assistance and development aid a fine-tuning was much needed even after the
EEAS Decision.This fine-tuning was about to deal in particular with the question
of how the assignment of responsibilities and authority would look like in
practice. To this end, the High Representative Catherine Ashton and
Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs announced right after the overall
political agreement provided with the EEAS Decision to draw up a new
inter-service agreement, spelling out the details of the arrangements.18 This would
replace the 2001 service agreement between the DGs Relex, Development and
EuropeAid and would contain detailed provisions for the conduct of the
programming and management cycle between the EEAS and the Commission.
However, it took another one and a half years until the modalities of cooperation
between the EEAS and the new DG ‘Development and Cooperation –
EuropeAid’ (DG DEVCO) could be finally fixed in an inter-service agreement on
13 January 2012.19 In the meantime, only a general service-level agreement was in
place, issued in December 2010.
The time this adjustment required clearly showed the extent of the need for
clarification. Nonetheless, Ashton had excluded the issue in her first EEAS report
in December 2011 with the argument that it is too early to make a judgment and
simply had noted that the EEAS and the Commission should work closely
17 Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organization and functioning of the European External Action
Service (2010/427/EU), O.J.E.U., L 201/30 (3 Aug. 2010) (further:‘EEAS Decision’).
18 See joint letter of Catherine Ashton, High Representative/Vice-President of the European
Commission, and Andris Piebalgs, Member of the European Commission, to Eva Joly, MEP (27 Jul.
2010), replying to her letter concerning the draft Council decision establishing the EEAS, www.
europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/deve/dv/ashton-piebalgs_jo/ashton-piebalgs_
joly.pdf.
19 Signed on 13 January 2012 by the Secretary General of the Commission and the Chief Operating
Officer of the EEAS, Working Arrangements between Commission Services and the European External Action
Service (EEAS) in relation to external relations issues, SEC(2012) 48 (10 Jan. 2012) (unpublished
SEC-document, further ‘Working Arrangements’).
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together in the preparations for the next multiannual financial framework.20 The
central organization-related points of contention, however, were obvious, in
particular with regard to the three main external assistance instruments EDF, DCI
and ENPI:What would it mean in practice when, as stated in Article 9(4) EEAS
Decision, any proposals shall be ‘prepared jointly’ by the relevant services in the
EEAS and in the Commission ‘under the responsibility’ of the Commissioner
responsible for Development Policy and shall be ‘submitted jointly’ with the High
Representative for adoption by the Commission?What roles should the EEAS and
the Commission Services take in the preparation of financial allocations, the
Strategy Papers and the Indicative Programs within the framework of the major
instruments for external assistance?21 Under which instructions would the new
EU Delegations work? How could the procedures between the new service units
be created to foster inter-service consultation and cooperation and without
unnecessary duplication and rivalry? And, finally, who should have the last word in
cases of disagreement?
4.1 DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE EEAS
As a diplomatic service, the EEAS is a body sui generis and supports the High
Representative (Article 27 TEU). It was deliberately conceived not as an EU
institution, but as a functionally autonomous body, under the authority of the HR.
The Service is, inter alia, also responsible for the policy dialogue and for the
funding and programming of external assistance and development aid. Its mission
is to ensure the coherence of the various dimensions of the external action of the
EU and to ensure a uniform approach towards third parties. In the area of external
assistance and development aid the EEAS is requested to take the objectives of the
development policy of the Union under Article 208 TFEU into account. In
addition to poverty, it would also promote the objectives of the European Consensus
on Development and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. These calls were
enshrined due to the pressure from the European Parliament with Article 1 (4)
EEAS Decision. But it has to be noted that this addition refers, despite the
reference to overarching goals, explicitly only to the area of development
cooperation, and therefore does not apply per se for all actions of the EEAS.
20 Ashton referred to the request of Art. 13 (2) EEAS Decision to report on the arrangements for
cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission services in the management of external financial
instruments, in particular as regards the programming of assistance. European External Action Service,
Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, Sec. 14 (22
Dec. 2011).
21 The provisions and procedures of the external action instruments EDF, DCI (geographic) and ENPI
are similar, see Art. 9 (4) for development respectively Art. 9 (5) for neighbourhood of the EEAS
Decision. Below the organization for DCI and EEF will be considered primarily.
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Figure 1 Organizational Structure of the European External Action Service
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/(March 2013)
The EEAS, since spring 2012 located at Rondpoint Schuman, is supposed to be
proportionally composed of former staff of the European Commission, the
Council Secretariat and the Member States diplomatic services.The equal share of
these three components shall be achieved by mid-2013, but a bias towards staff of
the Commission still persists.The EEAS has over 3200 staff, of whom around 1500
officers do their work at the EEAS headquarters in Brussels, plus more than 1800
employees are based in the EU Delegations. Organizational diagrams and
procedure charts do not replace a view behind the scenes, what can be derived
from them, however, are the reorganizations surrounding the EEAS.22 In
particular, the transfer of existing units of work, which enabled a quick launching
of the EEAS in the first place, becomes visible. In addition to units from the
General Secretariat of the Council (including the Policy Unit and the Directorate
General E), the entire General Directorate for External Relations and almost one
hundred units, especially country- and region-specific ones, were transferred from
the former Directorate General for Development to the newly established
EEAS.23
22 Organization chart (April 2013), eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf.
23 For details see the list of all the administrative entities transferred en bloc to the EEAS in the Annex of
the EEAS Decision. Permanent officials transferred to the new service include from DG Relex 585
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The EEAS is divided into five regional units of work (Asia and the Pacific,
Africa, Europe and Central Asia, North Africa and Middle East, the Americas, and
Africa), a thematic unit of work on Global and Multilateral Issues and one unit
dealing with Administration and Finance. Moreover, the EEAS comprises those
crisis management structures, which were transferred from the Commission, and in
particular from the Council Secretariat.The former split into ACP countries and
‘other countries’ was thus disbanded. Within the EEAS a horizontal unit is
responsible for the coordination of development cooperation, which is located
within the work unit Global and Multilateral Issues. In addition to the
coordination of development cooperation this unit is, inter alia, responsible for
human rights and democracy, election monitoring and combating terrorism.The
small unit serves as a focal point for development issues.24
It supports the High Representative both in the preparation of development
issues in the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and in her function as Vice-President
of the Commission, when dealing with development issues.The unit is supposed
to develop the guidelines for the programming of EDF and DCI and to ensure
policy coherence for development within the EEAS. To this end, the horizontal
unit is working with the relevant thematic and geographical directorates and
coordinates the inputs of the EEAS for the Commission’s drafts presented by DG
DEVCO. It is responsible to bring together the task force ‘development’ of the
EEAS, which is composed of officials from different geographic and thematic
directorates and meets once a month. Given this broad range of tasks the scarce
human resources allocated to the unit have been repeatedly criticized by
organizations close to development cooperation and have been interpreted as a
sign that development issues have no due weight within the EEAS. In particular
the ‘D’ in PCD is not being adequately acknowledged by the EEAS, who
supposedly interprets ‘development’ in this line of critic as an effort to ensure
consistency of EU policies with its foreign affairs agenda and not to fight poverty
in the first place.
4.2 THE NEW DIRECTORATE GENERAL DEVCO
The reorganizations taking place in the post-Lisbon phase surrounding the
establishment of the EEAS were clearly visible also in the European Commission.
It had started early with the Barroso II Commission, which began its work
posts, from DG Dev 93 posts, from Commission delegations 436 posts and 411 Council posts. See, A
new step in the setting-up of the EEAS: Transfer of staff on 1 January 2011, Press releases Rapid,
IP/10/1769 (21 Dec. 2010).
24 Here and section below J. Seters & H. Klavert, EU development cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty. People,
institutions and global trends, ecdpm,Discussion Paper 123 (Dec. 2011).
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in February 2010. Commission President José Manuel Barroso had assigned the
European Neighbourhood Policy, previously allocated within the competence of
the Commissioner responsible for external relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner to the
new Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Commissioner
Štefan Füle.This decision has been criticized as unnecessary on the one hand, at
the same time, however, it was understood as an effort to keep significant areas of
external action within the streamlined Commission. Part of this proactive strategy
of securing the status of the Commission was the reassignment of a number of
areas of competence of the EU Commissioners, which was associated with a
substantive overlap of the portfolios and was denounced by critics as ‘asset
stripping’.
This step may also have been justified by the fact that Barroso has the final say
as arbitrator in the College of Commissioners (Article 248 TFEU), irrespective of
the fact that Ashton with her ‘double-hat’ as Vice-President also is part of the
Commission, and who, even if no formal hierarchy exists among the
Commissioners, as High Representative has the task to coordinate the external
action of the EU (Article 18/21TEU). Barroso is also the one who sets the agenda
for the ‘Group of External Relations Commissioners’, a group he himself had
established. He may leave the chair to the HR/VP, what was not the case in the
meetings that were called only once or twice a year.25 In order to promote a more
coherent appearance in external relations, Barroso had also urged ‘his’
Commissioners responsible for development, humanitarian aid, and enlargement
and neighbourhood, to work closely with the EEAS.26
As shown, in addition to the transfer of the DG Relex to the EEAS, especially
country- and region-related positions were divested from the Directorate General
for Development (DG Dev) to the EEAS.27 Personnel from the former DG Dev
remaining in the EU Commission now constitutes, together with the EuropeAid
Cooperation Office (AIDCO), the new DG ‘Development and Cooperation –
EuropeAid’ (DEVCO).28 Led by Andris Piebalgs it resumed its work at the end of
2010, while a new service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) was set up in
January 2011. The new structure of DG DEVCO consists of three political and
thematic directorates (EU Development Policy, Human and Society Development
25 European Commission, Secretariat-General, Vademecum on working relations with the European External
Action Service (EEAS), SEC(2011)1636, s. 2.2.1 (2011).
26 Mission letters from President Barroso to the Commissioners designate Andris Piebalgs and Štefan
Füle (27 Nov. 2009), and Kristalina Georgieva (27 Jan. 2010), ec.europa.eu/commission_
2010-2014/mission_letters/index_en.htm.
27 For details see the list of all the administrative entities transferred en bloc to the EEAS in the Annex of
the EEAS Decision.
28 Organization chart (Mar. 2013), ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/documents/organigramme-devco_
en.pdf.
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and Sustainable Growth and Development), five geographic directorates (East and
Southern Africa and ACP Coordination,West and Central Africa, Neighbourhood,
Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, Central Asia, Middle East/Gulf and Pacific)
and an administrative directorate.
Figure 2 The Administrative Structure of Direction General DEVCO
Source: www.eeas.europa.eu/(April 2013)
The split within the Commission regarding developmental responsibilities into
DG Dev (responsible for the ACP countries) and DG Relex (responsible for all
‘other countries’), therefore, is a thing of the past. Within DG DEVCO the
Directorate A ‘EU Development Policy’ takes a leading role.29 It formulates the
general framework concerning the direction of the Directorate General,
responsibilities range from budget support and policy coherence for development
up to the effectiveness of aid and international development dialogue.
DG DEVCO has over 4,200 staff members, of whom about 1,300–1,500
employees work at DEVCO’s HQ in Brussels, plus the staff of approximately
3,000 employees in the EU Delegations. Although the DG DEVCO itself has
29 Directorate General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, Main missions of DEVCO
Directorates & Units, Final (03 Aug. 2011), ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/about/documents/dg-
devlpmt-coop-europeaid-mission-statements.pdf; Directorate General for Development and
Co-operation – EuropeAid, Management Plan 2012, ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/amp/doc/
devco_mp.pdf.
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transferred country-related officials and departments to the EEAS, at the same
time, however, it has gained a number of new competences (e.g., in regard of the
DCI, which geographic programs were previously under the auspices of DG
Relex). Initially, the transfer of the entire DG Relex to the EEAS was intended to
avoid rivalry between the EEAS and the High Representative on the one side and
a potential Commissioner for External Relations on the other side.30
Nevertheless, the strengthening of the role of DG DEVCO has now created a new
major player, and the Commissioner for Development, mandated by the President
of the Commission, represents the Commission in the Foreign Affairs Council.31
The Commission can be represented by another Commissioner should an agenda
item pertain to his portfolio. He may also represent the Commission in informal
Council meetings, such as the Gymnich meetings for example. In addition, the
Commission has, at least for the time-being, due to the transfer of Commission
officials to the EEAS, still a long arm reaching into the Service.
4.3 THE PART OF THE EU DELEGATIONS
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the existing
Commission Delegations were officially transformed into roughly 140 EU
Delegations. In the early 2000s reforms a decentralization of EU development had
been taken place, devolving authority and people to the Commission delegations
in order to increase the timeliness of EU support together with improved visibility
and reputation amongst partners. The Commission delegations had been tasked
with the responsibility for programme identification, programme preparation and
financial and technical implementation. With the Lisbon reform the rather
technical direction of work of the former Commission Delegations was extended
by adding more political functions.32
The new EU Delegations now perform also the CFSP-related tasks of the
rotating EU Presidency, such as the political dialogue. The Delegations are
composed of EEAS staff (entrusted mainly with political and representative
functions), of the Commission (assuming the implementation and evaluation of
those measures that fall – as ‘development’ and ‘neighbourhood’ – in their area of
expertise) and of associated personnel from the Member States. The Delegations
are according to Article 221 TFEU placed under the authority of the High
30 S.Vanhoonacker & N. Reslow, The European External Action Service: Living Forwards by Understanding
Backwards, 15 European For.Affairs Rev. 1, 1–18, at 9 (2010).
31 European Commission, Secretariat-General, supra n. 25, sec. 3.3.
32 See E. Drieskens, What’s in a Name? Challenges to the Creation of EU Delegations, 17 Hague
J. Diplomacy 1, 51–64 (2012); Principles and Practices of EU External Representation: Selected Legal Aspects
(S. Blockmans & R.A.Wessel eds., CLEERWorking Papers 5, 2012).
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Representative, however, the HR and the EEAS and the Commission – in areas
such as ‘development’ and ‘neighbourhood’ (Article 5(3) EEAS Decision) – can
issue direct instructions to the delegation. Basically, they should be channelled
through the EEAS, but the multiplicity of authority to issue instructions leads to
foreseeable difficulties. Ashton has explicitly pointed to this problem in her first
EEAS report and has reaffirmed the principle that all delegation staff are in their
everyday work subject to the head of delegation, who, if necessary, can remit
certain matters to the head office in Brussels (e.g., in case of contradictory
directions issued by the EEAS and the Commission).33 The joint decision of
March 2012 from EEAS and Commission to set up a cooperation mechanism
concerning the management of Delegations was intended to improve their
difficult relationship and to clarify lines of reporting and authority.34 It not only
confirms the status of the head of the delegation, but also established a joint
steering committee of EEAS and DG DEVCO (EUDEL).The coordinating role
of the EU Delegations is particularly crucial in external assistance and
development aid.They not only take on a major role in the various stages of the
planning and management cycle, but are also responsible for a close working
relationship with the diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States – and
therefore for the ‘Joint Programming’ of aid. They serve as focal points for the
partner governments and function as ‘eyes and ears’35 on the ground for the
Brussels headquarters.
5 THE PROGRAMMING OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT AID FOR THE YEARSTO COME
The postulated goal with the establishment of the EEAS is to streamline external
assistance and development aid under the authority of the newly established
diplomatic service, tying it strategically to a more coherent and efficient foreign
policy.Accordingly, the distribution of tasks of the programming and management
cycle were redistributed with the EEAS Decision and resulted in a rather complex
arrangement set out in Article 9 of the EEAS Decision.
33 European External Action Service, Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission, sec. 18 (22 Dec. 2011).
34 Decision of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on
Cooperation Mechanisms Concerning the Management of Delegations of the European Union, JOIN (2012) 8
final (28 Mar. 2012).
35 M. Furness, The Lisbon Treaty, the European External Action service and the Reshaping of EU Development
Policy, in The European Union and Global Development:An ‘Enlightened Superpower’ in the Making? 74–93
(S. Gänzle et al. eds., Houndmill 2012).
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Figure 3 Programming and Management Cycle of External Assistance and
Development Aid for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020
(Excluding Member States)
Before Lisbon the five-staged programming and implementing cycle of external
assistance and development policy was fully executed by the Commission:36 The first
three stages of the programming cycle were dealt with either within DG Relex (DCI
and ENPI) or DG Dev (EDF), according to the respective geographic responsibility.
With the exceptionof theDCI thematic programmes that fallwithin the responsibility
of the Development Commissioner,37 the Commissioner for External Relations had
the political responsibility.The implementation in the two subsequent stages was then
executed by EuropeAid.
With the EEAS Decision responsibilities of the programming and management
cycle were reshuffled:38 Overall strategic and political coordination is from now on
36 For more details on each of the five stages of the programming and management cycle of EU’s
external assistance instruments see M. Gavas & E. Koeb, Setting up the European External Action Service:
Building a Comprehensive Approach, Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Background Note (London
2010). The five stages comprise accordingly: (1) strategically assessing the situation and identifying
general response objectives in Country or Regional Strategy Papers; (2) deciding on the multiannual
allocation of aid resources; (3) defining fields of EU activity through National and Regional Indicative
Programmes (N/RIPs); (4) setting out Annual Action Programmes; (5) implementing by means of
managing, contracting, monitoring and evaluating.
37 Under the Multiannual financial framework 2007–2013 the thematic programmes comprise roughly
40% and the geographic programmes 60% of the funds provided by the DCI.
38 Humanitarian Assistance, the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) and financial assistance to
non-European Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) are not covered by Art. 9 EEAS Decision.
The programming and management is under the responsibility of DG ECHO, DG ELARG and DG
DEVCO respectively.
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supposed to be ensured by theHighRepresentative and theEEAS,while theCommis-
sion is responsible for the subsequent implementation.Therefore theEEASprepares,as
stated in Article 9(3) EEAS Decision, the strategic, multiannual steps within the
programming cycle and prepares the country allocations to determine the global
financial envelope for each region,the country and regional strategic papers (C/RSPs)
and the national and regional indicative programmes (N/RIPs).All proposals for deci-
sions are prepared by following theCommission’s procedures and are submitted to the
Commission for adoption.
At first sight this approach seems to be straightforward. However, excluded
from this division of labour – and this is crucial – is the overall strategic and
political coordination of the portfolios ‘development’ and ‘neighbourhood’ as
stated in Article 9 (4, 5) EEAS Decision: The three most important external
assistance and development instruments DCI (the geographic programmes), EDF
and ENPI remain ‘under the responsibility’ – and not, as originally drafted in
Ashtons proposal ‘under the guidance and supervision’ – of the Commissioners for
Development Policy respectively Neighbourhood Policy and shall be submitted
jointly with the High Representative for adoption by the Commission.
Additionally, thematic programmes, other than the European Instrument for
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument for Nuclear Safety
Cooperation (INSC) and parts of the Instrument for Stability (IfS), are under the
sole responsibility of the Commission and shall be prepared by the appropriate
Commission service under the guidance of the Commissioner responsible for
Development Policy and presented to the College of Commissioners in agreement
with the High Representative and the other relevant Commissioners (Article 9(4)
EEAS Decision).
These are the general specification of the EEAS Decision. Translating them
into practice is obviously not an easy task:What does it mean when the proposals
shall be ‘prepared jointly’ by the EEAS and the Commission ‘under the
responsibility’ of the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and shall
be ‘submitted jointly’ with the High Representative for adoption by the
Commission? Ashton and Piebalgs had, as noted earlier, announced to give an
answer to these questions and to clarify the EEAS Decision by agreeing on a
memorandum of understanding between the two institutions. Given the budget
negotiations on external assistance and development aid for the Multiannual
financial framework 2014–2020 the fine-tuning of the EEAS Decision came under
considerable time pressure. The aid programming was supposed to start with the
country allocations at the beginning of 2012, so that projects and programmes can
be developed within 2013 and implementation can finally start in 2014.
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TheWorking Arrangements between Commission Services and the European
External Action Service in relation to external relations issues were finally signed
in January 2012, adding an additional layer of complexity to the already
fragmented and heavy process.39 Where the EEAS Decision calls for joint
responsibility they specify the tasks for each of the approval stages of the
programming and management cycle for EEAS and DG DEVCO.This especially
applies for the proposals for EDF, ENPI, and the geographic programmes of DCI
(thematic programmes are adopted by the Commission), where the task of
preparing the decisions for the Commission is shared between the EEAS and DG
DEVCO. Similarly to the pre-Lisbon programming and management cycle, based
on the division of labour of DG Relex, DG Dev and the Commission delegations,
the EU Delegations play an important part.
The programming arrangements for the Strategy Papers40 and the Multi-
annual Indicative Programmes for the instruments mentioned above read as below
(see Figure 4 for more details of the approval steps): The EEAS prepares, in
agreement with DG DEVCO, the guidelines from the Development
Commissioner (or the respective Commissioner for Neighbourhood) to
Delegations, setting out the main objectives and principles. On the basis of these
the Delegations will launch a consultation process with the partner country in
coordination with EU Member States before sending their proposals for Strategy
Papers and Indicative Programmes to EEAS and DG DEVCO. The EEAS
transmits them to relevant Commission DGs and services in view of a Country
Team Meeting (CTM), organized jointly with DG DEVCO. CTM assess the
Delegation’s proposals and ensure consistency with programming guidelines
before the Strategy papers and Indicative programmes are submitted to the
Inter-service Quality Support Group (iQSG) and the Inter-service Consultations
are launched. The Interservice Consultation will be launched by the EEAS in
agreement with DG DEVCO following agreement for the respective
Commissioners and the HR/VP in accordance with the normal Commission
decision-making procedure and rules. DG DEVCO then provides the chair and
secretariat for the comitology procedure, while the EEAS prepares the files in
agreement with DG DEVCO and presents the draft Commission Decisions to the
Committee and replies to any questions. In the subsequent democratic scrutiny
dialogue, both EEAS and DG DEVCO will then be responsible for replying to
39 Working Arrangements between Commission Services and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in
relation to external relations issues, SEC(2012) 48 (10 Jan. 2012) (unpublished SEC-document).
40 The EU discontinues the practice of developing Country Strategy Papers and programming can be
simplified by replacing them with other existing strategy documents (such as Joint Framework
Documents (JFD) or partner country’s national strategy papers). See e.g. European Commission/High
Representative, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Global Europe. A New
Approach to Financing EU External Action, COM(2011) 865 final (7 Dec. 2011).
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Figure 4 Programming Arrangements between Commission Services
and the EEASon EU Financial Assistance and Cooperation for the
Multiannual financial framework
Country and Regional Aid Allocation
Allocations are adopted pursuant to EDF / DCI / ENPI Regulations and are 
then established by the EEAS in agreement with DEVCO
Steps for Approval of Country and Regional Strategy Papers and Multi-
annual Indicative Programmes under ENPI, EDF and DCI (geographic)
Steps for Approval of Thematic Strategy Papers and Multi-
annual Indicative Programmes under the DCI
Programming guidelines to Delegations, are prepared by 
EEAS, in agreement with DEVCO, setting out main 
objectives and principles
Programming guidelines are prepared by DEVCO, in 
consultation with EEAS, setting out the main objectives and 
principles
Country team meetings, organised by EEAS and DEVCO, 
assess proposals and ensure consistency with programming 
guidelines
Consultation of stakeholders are undertaken by DEVCO, 
EEAS is invited
Consultation with the partner country are launched by the 
Delegation in coordination with MS
Thematic team meetings assess and ensure consistency with 
programming guidelines. DEVCO may invite EEAS to seek 
approval
Proposals by Delegations for Strategy Papers and Indicative 
Programmes are sent to EEAS and DEVCO
Proposals of Strategy Papers and Indicative Programmes are 
prepared by DEVCO, in consultation with EEAS (in case of 
region or country allocation in agreement with EEAS)
Submitted to the inter-service quality support group (iQSG) Submitted to the iQSG
Following agreement from the respective Commissioner and 
the HR/VP an inter-service consulation is launched by the 
EEAS in agreement with DEVCO 
Following agreement from the Commisioner for 
development an inter-service consultation is launched, 
consulting the EEAS
Opinion to be delivered by the MS in accordance with 
comitology procedure. DEVCO chaires and provides a 
secretariat. EEAS prepares files and presents draft 
commission decisions to the committee
Opinion to be delivered by the MS in accordance with 
comitology procedure. DEVCO chaires and provides a 
secretariat, and prepares the files and presents the draft 
decision to the committee. EEAS is systematically invited
Democratic scrutiny dialogue with the EP (except in case of 
EDF). EEAS and DEVCO are responsible for replying to 
queries 
Democratic scrutiny dialogue with the EP. DEVCO is 
responsible for replying to queries from the relevant 
committees
Procedure for adoption by the Commission is launched by 
the EEAS in agreement with DEVCO. A designated 
member of the college signs the document with the 
beneficiary country/region
Procedure for adoption by the Commission is launched by 
DEVCO, in agreement with the EEAS
DEVCO prepares annual action programmes
Delegations provide substantial input for the draft proposals, keeping the EEAS fully informed. After the 
interservice consultation of the EEAS and relevant Commision services, which will be launched 
following the agreement of the Commissioner for Development, DEVCO presents the draft to the 
relevant comitology precedurce, for which it ensures the chair, the secretariat and replies to any 
questions/requests from MS. EEAS will be invited. The proposal for adoption of the Commission 
Decision is launched by DEVCO.
DEVCO HQ or Delegations can begin implementation
Under the responsibility of DG DEVCO. EEAS contributes through the Heads of Delegation acting as 
sub-delegated authorising officers. Systematic reporting submitted by the Head of Delegation to DEVCO
will be shared with EEAS.
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queries from the European Parliament. After adoption by the Commission, that is
launched by the EEAS in agreement with DG DEVCO, the designated member
of the College will sign on behalf of the Commission the pertinent document
with the beneficiary country/region, where required. After the adoption DG
DEVCO begins with the preparation of the Annual Action Programmes. The
implementation and evaluation is managed by the Commission.
Even this simplified description illustrates that with the replacement of DG
Relex by the EEAS the cumbersome procedure was not, as initially intended,
simplified. The EEAS, positioned outside the Commission, needs to be fully
infixed into the Commission system in order to produce a satisfying result.
Without strong internal cohesion this complex system bears several breaking
points, involving risks of malfunctioning. For its functioning a constant workflow
is required, in which the two services in close cooperation with the EU
Delegations must work together as a quasi-organic unity – in principle a laudable
ambition, but given the institutional history and the prevailing dispute
accompanying their setting-up as shown earlier this remains at least questionable.
In light of this it will be challenging to actually implement the reform of the
external action instruments for the Multiannual Framework 2014–2020 as
initiated by the Commission. These impediments might turn out to be more
critical than freezing the budget of Heading 4 ‘Global Europe’, although this
implies a de facto resignation from the goal to provide 0.7% ODA by 2015. Even
so the reforms of the external action instruments are less significant than in 2006,
when the architecture of the external action instruments for the Multiannual
Framework 2007–2013 was substantially altered,41 there are a range of
long-overdue innovations on their way that risk to be minimized. Among others
these include in addition to a more differentiated approach a better impact
assessment through better evaluation of the needs of the recipient country and its
absorptive capacity.
6 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE EU AS
GLOBAL ACTOR
In her first address to the European Parliament, Catherine Ashton had designed a
common, unified strategy as raison d’être of the EEAS.With the establishment of
the EEAS change was supposed to be for the better. After two years of
reorganization of European procedures and competences, a closer look at the
strategic planning and programming of external assistance and development aid
41 See S. Bartelt, The Institutional Interplay Regarding the New Architecture for the EC’s External Assistance, 14
European L. J. 5, 655–679 (Sept. 2008).
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reveals a less than satisfactory picture. Programming after Lisbon should have
become more consistent and targeted. Instead of a streamlined and simplified
procedure the current organization of the strategic aid programming between the
EEAS and the Commission, at least so far, represents a fault-prone copy of the
pre-Lisbon situation.
In fact, the EEAS can even as defined as sui generis actor only to a limited
extent be regarded as a genuinely new actor. Many deficiencies can be explained
with its forty-year history and by the fundamental shortcomings of European
foreign policy in general.42 However, even an incremental progress, as could be
observed in the creation of the EEAS, affects the future direction of the EU’s
external relations. Thus, the fragmented arrangements before Lisbon are already
reflected in the EEAS compromise of the ‘quadrilogue’ and in the subsequent
fine-tuning of the EEAS Decision.This is particularly a consequence of the en bloc
transfer of existing units of work to the EEAS as well as of the adaptation of the
complex procedures of the programming of EDF, DCI and ENPI that duplicate
the existing responsibilities of DG Relex, DG Dev and EuropeAid. Even when the
portfolios ‘development’ and to a much lesser extent ‘neighbourhood’ remain
under the responsibility of the Commissioners responsible – and therefore for the
time-being out of reach of the more immediate political influence of the
diplomatic service and whatever kind of comprehensive approach – two cleavages
that existed already before Lisbon now become more apparent:
– Poverty reduction can be promoted more distinctly in the future. In recent
years it has been repeatedly criticized that a high proportion of ODA funds
is awarded to middle-income countries, rather than to the poorest
countries. Some critics have argued that this obstructs poverty reduction.
This line of reasoning so far has been visible within the Commission –
between DG Relex and DG Dev – and becomes now even more evident
with the relocation of DG Relex into the EEAS. In its institutional
self-assertion against the EEAS, DG DEVCO as a fairly autonomous player
on the global development agenda uses poverty reduction to sharpen its
profile and thus simultaneously legitimizes its political mandate. This has
become more visible with the Agenda for Change and is part of the current
allocation of funds for the Multiannual financial framework 2014–2020.
Reform steps were initiated with the differentiated development
partnerships in order to ensure that the aid is channelled to the poorest
countries or to the neediest part of the population in middle-income
countries. For middle-income countries (among them the BRICS states)
42 Vanhoonacker & Reslow, supra n. 30, at 9.
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with the new Partnership Instrument other forms of cooperation are
created.
– The nexus between security and development has also become more
visible. This process has been accompanied with a widely feared
‘securitization’. It was feared that merging different policies under a single
strategy would be executed at the expense of genuine development issues.
Catherine Ashton had made it clear from the start that she would take the
mandate of the Treaty seriously, and would also foster the links between
development and European foreign policy. Within the development
community meanwhile the rationale has taken place that the provision of
security in third countries is a prerequisite for the success of development
policies. In recent years, therefore, a number of intersections have emerged.
This is illustrated, for example, by the strategy for the Horn of Africa43
(November 2011) and in particular by the strategy for development and
security in the Sahel region44 (March 2011). Even though these strategies
have been prepared jointly with the Commission, it is evident, however,
that the topic security and development is discussed in a more political and
more offensive way today and issues such as piracy, riots in the EU border
regions and migration are more clearly linked with the EU’s own security.
It can therefore be assumed that the debates on the nexus between security and
development will intensify and the fight against poverty will also receive stronger
impetus with regard to the evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of
development policy. A tectonic shift in the general orientation of the EU’s
external relations, however, is not very likely, even though the setting-up of the
EEAS resulted in an institutional distance between the former working areas of
DG Relex and DG Dev and increased the risk of establishing two operating
systems working in parallel.
While controversies due to the complexity of the programming and
management cycle seem to be inevitable, the inter-service cooperation at the
working level held no major surprises – neither in a positive nor negative way.
Through the transfer of existing units of work, the officials are in their majority
familiar with the Commission proceedings and their counterparts in the respective
services. Due to the transfer of former DG Relex units to the EEAS this is
particularly the case in the area of neighbourhood. Out of necessity
Neighbourhood Commissioner Füle is obliged to work with ‘his’ former staff
now located under the roof of the EEAS, a working relationship that is
well-established by now. Development on the other hand is still deep-seated in the
43 register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st16/st16858.en11.pdf.
44 eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf.
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Commission, where the working units and policy expertise under the authority of
Commissioner Piebalgs are located. In both domains a certain inter-service
fraternization is visible on the working levels, while the old disputes are still being
conducted at the political level. Nonetheless, frictions are inevitable. This is not
only the case at the juncture of strategic planning and implementation, a
problematic link in itself. Problems do also arise where parallel units with a
geographical focus show the tendency to compete with rather than to
complement each other.
Far more problematic, however, is the situation in the EU Delegations, where
duplications are more direct and tangible in everyday business.This is the case, for
example, when loyalty conflicts arise regarding instructions and reporting
requirements in the EEAS and the Commission. It is already clear today that this
not only applies to the first stages of the strategic planning and programming until
2014, where the EEAS has – at least formally – taken the lead. The announced
reforms of the external action instruments for the Multiannual framework
2014–2020 can only be implemented successfully if an intensive exchange of
information and ideally staff, and close cooperation on all levels managed by staff
in headquarters and in the field are actually put into practice.Without a dissolution
of the systemic barriers impeding the organization of external assistance and
development aid, the lower levels of work will hardly be able to meet the
up-coming challenges.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In summary it can be said that the balancing act of the programming and
management cycle between the Service and the Commission is of no discernible
value in the area of external assistance and development aid when it comes to the
synergy and impact hoped for. Even if the financial crisis seemingly shut the doors
for strengthening cooperation in European foreign policy, the last word on the
balancing of powers between the EEAS and the Commission is not yet spoken. In
2013 the review of the EEAS Decision will be launched, once again with the
declared goal of achieving a comprehensive and integrated approach for all
components of the EU’s international profile. In order to achieve this, the Future
of Europe Group, orchestrated by the German Foreign MinisterWesterwelle, called
for a relocation of central external action areas (such as neighbourhood) under the
responsibility of the High Representative and the EEAS and claims a
strengthening of her competencies in development cooperation.45 Accordingly,
45 Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain (17 Sep. 2012); see also the
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one can expect that the organization of external assistance and development aid
remains to be an unsettled issue. The resulting fundamental institutional and
political issues will continue to complicate the interaction at the working level
between the EEAS, DG DEVCO and particularly the EU Delegations as a
quasi-organic unity.
The European Commission succeeded in its self-assertion against the EEAS
to act as a constant on the European stage. With its Agenda for Change and its
impulses for an adaptation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the
Commission has set the political direction for the European external assistance and
development aid instruments. On the Commission’s initiative the EU – at least at
the declaratory level – is about to open a revised chapter in the organization of its
external assistance and development aid instruments for the years after 2013.The
EEAS in turn will be keen on putting its own footprints on Joint Decisions and
especially to play a more visible and offensive role when it comes to security issues
as foreseen in the French proposals for the EEAS reform.
For the time-being, in the absence of a CFSP living up to its name Brussels
foreign policy will henceforth primarily be executed by the European
Commission, focussing mainly on its portfolios ‘trade’ and ‘development’
(respectively ‘neighbourhood’ in its extension). This trend is further strengthened
by the withdrawal of EU Member States from European foreign policy that risk to
be caught up in the crisis management of the euro crisis.Adding financial cuts due
to fiscal austerity requirements of national aid budgets this means that the
European Commission will have a certain leeway to actually carry out activities
and conduct a common policy as stated in theTreaty.
This is, however, no reason to jump to conclusions: Whether there is a
possibility after almost two years of organizational introspection to actually
implement the overarching goal of poverty reduction does not solely depend on
the inter-service harmony between the EEAS and the Commission. For poverty
reduction not to remain just a particular objective of the EU, it will be crucial
which weight development will be allowed in the entire canon of external action.
Those areas from the perspective of policy coherence relevant to development – in
particular trade, agriculture and fisheries, energy and climate or fiscal issues – are
mainly out of reach of the diplomatic Service and have long been in the hands of
the European Commission. Seen from this angle one has to note that the change
to the better hoped for with the organizational harmony of EEAS and the
Commission rapidly shrinks to its true extent.
Non-Paper of 14 Member States (including Germany, without United Kingdom and France) on
Strengthening the European External Action Service (1 Feb. 2013).
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